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covers "scalping," the nearly unanimous approval by the Supreme
Court of the liberal interpretation of the provisions in this case
should certainly have an impact upon securities regulation in the
future. It should facilitate regulation of the industry, since broad
legislation-intended to be interpreted broadly-can be enacted with
reasonable assurance that its effect will not be unduly restricted by
marrow interpretation.
COWLES LIIPFERT

Torts-Ifdependent Contractors-Duty of Care
In Heldenfels v. Hernandez' an employee of the owner of
property on which construction work was being done brought action
against a paving subcontractor for injuries sustained by the employee
'when struck by a backing truck. The jury found that the subcontractor failed to provide a flagman to warn the employee of the
backing truck but found no affirmative negligence. The Texas
court held that the plaintiff -was merely a licensee as to the subcontractor and that it had breached no duty owed to the landowner's
employee by its failure to provide a flagman. Even though the
subcontractor owned no interest in the land, the court reasoned that
it became an occupant of the private premises for the purpose of the
construction work, and that although an occupier or owner of land
may owe to a licensee the duty to warn him of concealed hazardous
conditions, there is no duty to warn him of dangers on the land which
are not concealed.
Owners and occupiers of land have been given immunities concerning the exercise of care which are not, as a general rule, available
to others. It may be broadly stated that an owner or occupier has
no duty of care toward a trespasser except the duty not to wilfully
injure him
He has a duty toward licensees which includes a duty
to warn of concealed dangerous conditions of the premises of which
"0Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 206(4), added by § 9, 74 Stat. 887
(1960), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (Supp. IV 1963).
1366 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
'Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896); Hooker v. Routt
Realty Co., 102 Colo. 8, 76 P.2d 431 (1938); Previte v. Wanskuck Co., 80
R.I. 1, 90 A.2d 769 (1952). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.1
(1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES].
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he has knowledge. 3 He has no duty to use care to inspect his
premises or take precautions for the safety of a licensee.4 The
principal case raises the question who, if anyone, should be permitted
to take advantage of the limited duties of the owner or occupier of
land. On this question there is a solid division of authority in this
country. Generally all courts agree that these immunities of the
owner or occupier extend to the members of his household and to his
servants during the course of their employment. 5 The Restatement
of Torts adds independent contractors to the list of those who may
derive the benefit of these exemptions, 6 and several jurisdictions, including the Texas court in the principal case, have adopted this view.t
Other courts have limited the exemptions to those designated either
as "owner," "possessor" or "occupant." These courts have taken
the view that on strictly technical and historical grounds the exemptions should apply only to those who have a proprietary interest in the
land.8 The term "possession" in this context is held to mean under
one's control and the right to exclude every other person from dealing
with it.9 The term "occupant" ordinarily implies a person having
possessory rights who can control any activity on the premises. 10
There are reasonable grounds for extending a landowner's exemptions to the members of his family for a verdict against a mem'See, e.g., Straight v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 354 Pa. 391, 47 A.2d 605
(1946). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES § 27.1 (1956).
'Rosenberger v. Consolidated Coal Co., 318 Ill. App. 8, 47 N.E.2d 491
(1943); Brauner v. Leutz, 293 Ky. 406, 169 S.W.2d 4 (1943); Myszkiewicz
v. Lord Baltimore Filling Stations, Inc., 168 Md. 642, 178 AUt. 856 (1935).
See, e.g., Hamakawa v. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co., 4 Cal. 2d 499,
50 P.2d 803 (1935); Mikaelian v. Palaza, 300 Mass. 354, 15 N.E.2d 480
(1938) ; Sohn v. Katz, 112 N.J.L. 106, 169 AUt. 838 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).
See also

RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 382 (1938).
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 383 (1938).

McIntyre v. Converse, 238 Mass. 592, 131 N.E. 198 (1921); Waller v.
Smith, 116 Wash. 645, 200 Pac. 95 (1921). Annot., 90 A.L.R. 886 (1934).
It is now probably the majority opinion that one who maintains wires over
another's land cannot take advantage of the landowner's exemptions. Annot.,
56 A.L.R. 1021 (1928).
'Fort Wayne & N. I. Traction Co. v. Stark, 74 Ind. App. 669, 127 N.E.
460 (1920); Godfrey v. Kansas City Light & Power Co., 299 Mo. 472, 253
S.W. 233 (1923); Cooper v. North Coast Power Co., 117 Ore. 652, 244 Pac.
665 (1926).
'Green v. Menveg Properties, Inc., 126 Cal. 2d 1, 271 P.2d 544 (1954).
It is that condition of facts under which one can exercise his power over a
corporeal thing to the exclusion of all other persons. Starits v. Avery, 204
Iowa 401, 213 N.W. 769 (1927).
" United States v. Fox, 60 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Lechler v. Chapin,
12 Nev. 65 (1877) ; Wittkop v. Garner, 4 N.J. Misc. 234, 132 At. 339 (Sup.
Ct. 1926).
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ber of the family will in all probability ultimately fall on the shoulders
of the landowner. The extension of these exemptions to his servants
during the course of their employment may also be justified, for if
the servant is held liable, the master may also be liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. To deny the servant the exemption
would deprive the landowner of that to which the law says he is
entitled. No such result would follow in refusing to extend the
exemptions to an independent contractor. The Restatement of Torts
recognizes a distinction between one who is on the land "on behalf
of" the landowner, such as an independent contractor, and one on
the land in some other capacity, such as an easement owner."1 The
former but not the latter, according to the Restatement, gets the
landowner's immunity. Dean Prosser says that this distinction
reconciles most of the cases.'1
Dean Prosser's observation may well explain the North Carolina court's refusal to extend the exemptions in some early cases,
but one who looks at the cases with the cynic's eye might well wonder
if the results might not be explained by something other than the
"on behalf of" theory. In most of the cases in which the court has
specifically refused to extend the exemptions to the holder of an
easement, the defendant was an electric power company.'
Since
the exemptions stem from land ownership, it would appear that the
easement owner would be more entitled to the exemptions than would
a defendant who has no interest in the land of any kind. The inclusion of the independent contractor stands on a different footing
than the inclusion of members of the landowner's family or his
servants. Upon analysis it would seem to be unjustified upon any
sound grounds. His exclusion from the requirement of using due
care does not spring from the land, for he has no interest in the land.
He is not an "occupant," "owner" or "possessor" as these terms
are used in designating an estate in land.Y4
11

RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 383-86

(1938).

TORTS § 76 (2d ed. 1955). According to Dean Prosser the
"inbehalf of" theory extends the landowner immunities to independent contractors who are acting in behalf of the landowner and denies the immunities
to those, such as electric power companies, who have an easement across the
lands of another in order to further their own interest.
"' Ferrell v. Durham Traction Co., 172 N.C. 682, 90 S.E. 893 (1916);
Benton v. North Carolina Pub. Serv. Corp., 165 N.C. 354, 81 S.E. 448
(1914).
" For a discussion of these terms see Garver v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 69
Iowa 202, 28 N.W. 555 (1886); Nevin v. Louisville Trust Co., 258 Ky.
187, 79 S.W.2d 688 (1935).
12

PROSSER,
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North Carolina seems to have agreed with the absurdity of
allowing one to defend on the grounds that the plaintiff was a
trespasser as to a third party, although it should be kept in mind
the considerations as to whether or not the defendant was on the
land in his own behalf rather than "on behalf of" the landowner.
In Ferrellv. Durham Traction Co.15 the court aptly stated the basis
of the exemption from the duty of reasonable care as being "a
principle growing out of and dependent upon the rights of ownership
and considered essential to their proper enjoyment.... [R]ecovery
is not... denied merely because... the injured party is himself a
trespasser"' 0 (to a third party). In Benton v. North CarolinaPub.
Serv. Corp.'T a child was killed while climbing a tree growing on land
over which defendant held an easement when the child came in
contact with defendant's poorly insulated wires. It was held that
"it is immaterial to consider whether the boy killed was a trespasser.
He certainly was not trespassing upon any property of the defendant." 8 Although the defendant's easement merely contemplated
Denial of recovery can be best explained by the fact that there was no
negligence. In Ellis v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 24 Tenn. App. 279, 143
S.W.2d 108 (1939), the defendant was employed to fumigate the residence
of the plaintiff. To effectuate this purpose it was necessary that the plaintiff
and his family vacate the residence for twenty-four hours. The plaintiff's
intestate, a child of tender years, entered the house and was asphyxiated.
The evidence disclosed that the defendant had warned the family of the
extreme danger involved and of the imperative necessity of remaining out of
the house for twenty-four hours; in addition the defendant had locked the
house from the inside, placed two substantial padlocks on the two outside
doors, and placed large red-lettered warning signs around the premises.
The court found no liability on the basis that the deceased child was a
trespasser.
In Hamakawa v. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co., 4 Cal. 2d 499, 50
P.2d 803 (1935), General Steamship Company had general control of the
dock where the defendant was engaged in loading a ship. The steamship
company required persons to obtain from them a permit to go upon the dock.
Plaintiff, without permission, went on the dock and in so doing went upon a
portion which he would have been guided around had he obtained permission.
While on this portion of the dock he was struck by a bale of paper which
the defendant knocked off the balcony of the warehouse. It was held that
since plaintiff was present without permission of defendant and that as he
had no business with either defendant or the ship hewas a trespasser and
defendant only owed a duty to refrain from wilful injury. The court could
have better supported a decision of no liability on the basis of no duty
because of the unforeseeability of someone being in the restricted area without
permission.
10 172 N.C. 682, 90 S.E. 893 (1916).
Id. at 684, 90 S.E. at 893-94.
'"165 N.C. 354, 81 S.E. 448 (1914).
8
I at 357, 81 S.E. at 449.
1d.
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transmission lines, he obviously had more of an interest in the land
than would a mere independent contractor.
In 1937 Mr. Pafford' 9 seemed to have brought North Carolina
in line with the Restatement,20 and those jurisdictions which have
adopted its view,2 1 by falling down an elevator shaft maintained by
an independent contractor on the property of another. The court in
denying recovery designated Mr. Pafford a licensee. The court
seems to have given no thought to the possibility that in relieving the
defendant from the exercise of due care while on the premises of
another, it was relieving defendant from such duty altogether, as it
may reasonably be assumed that its business will always be carried
out on the property of another. It is not disclosed whether or not
Mr. Pafford was left with the ability to ponder this question. The
court made no reference to its earlier decisions and in designating
the defendant as one in possession there is no indication that serious
consideration was given to the question.
A defendant who was engaged in activity similar to the defendant
in the Pafford case was held to the duty of exercising due care in
Bemont v. Isenhour,2 2 but on the theory that the plaintiff's position
with respect to the defendant was "at least that of an invitee." The
court seems to imply that recovery would have been denied otherwise,
and yet the proper test would seem to be whether or not the plaintiff's
presence and resulting injury could have been reasonably foreseen by
the defendant.
In McIntyre v. Monarch Elevator CoY2 an independent contractor was repairing an elevator located in a medical clinic. The
plaintiff was on her way to see one of the doctors when she fell down
the shaft as a result of the defendant having left the elevator door
open. The court held that the defendant was chargeable with the
duty of exercising reasonable care for the safety of those who
rightfull use or attempt to use the elevator. No mention was made
in the opinion as to plaintiff's position as either invitee or licensee,
and except for the qualifying clause emphasized it would appear
that the court was reaffirming its earlier decisions not to consider
" Pafford v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 217 N.C. 730, 9 S.E.2d 408 (1940).
" RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 382 (1938).
" Key West Elec. Co. v. Roberts, 81 Fla. 743, 89 So. 122 (1921); Hafey
v. Turners Falls Power & Elec. Co., 240 Mass. 155, 133 N.E. 107 (1921);
Parshall v. Lapeer Gas-Elec. Co., 228 Mich. 80, 199 N.W. 599 (1924).
22249 N.C. 106, 105 S.E.2d 431 (1958).
22230 N.C. 539, 54 S.E.2d 45 (1949).
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the limitations of a landowner's duty except in cases involving a
landowner, members of his household or his servants. Again
whether or not the defendant could reasonably foresee harm resulting to someone would seem to be the proper test as to whether the
defendant be chargeable with the duty to exercise reasonable care
for their safety, rather than any label which might be attached to
the body Hying at the bottom of the shaft. The exemptions traditionally extended to a landowner require these labels, but there seems
to be no good reason to extend such exemptions further.
It is difficult to determine with any degree of certainty what position the North Carolina court would take if called upon to decide
head-on whether an independent contractor was entitled to the
exemptions allowed the landowner or possessor on whose premises he
was conducting his activity. In the cases noted here the defendants
were held to have a duty of due care with the exception of the
Pafford case. Quaere if the court there did not inadvertently give
to the words "one in possession" a wider scope than they would have
been willing to give after deliberate consideration of the possible
effect of such extension. It is conceivable that a building contractor
might lease the premises upon which he had contracted to construct
a building in order to acquire the immunities granted to such proprietary interest. Were this the purpose it would seem to be an attempt
to contract away his liability. The courts have consistently held such
contracts void as being detrimental to the public good.24 It is inconceivable that the court would consciously do for the independent
contractor that which they would not tolerate his doing for himself.
It would also seem that the court would be very reluctant to deliberately overrule the sound logic of the earlier cases which held that
a trespass was immaterial if only an infringement upon the rights of
a third party. 5
The landowner has been a favorite of the law. According to
Blackstone the right of private ownership of property was one of the
three absolute rights of English law. The law's regard for this
right was so great that it would "not authorize the least violation
of it ... even for the general good of the whole community. '2 6
24Brown v. Postal Tel. Co.,
111 N.C. 187, 16 S.E. 179 (1892); Jankele v.
Texas Co., 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425 (1936).
" Ferrell v. Durham Traction Co. 172 N.C. 682, 90 S.E. 893 (1916);
Benton v. North Carolina Pub. Serv. Corp., 165 N.C. 354, 81 S.E. 448
(1914).
" 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138.
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The exemption was applied with harshness and inflexability. From
this strict observance of the sanctity of property, courts have attempted to restrict the application of the exemptions in particular
instances through classification of plaintiffs into categories such as
"trespasser," "licensee" or "invitee." The landowner's freedom
from a duty was in this manner modified. Even as to the trespasser
most courts have discarded the "wilful or wanton" formula and have
stated that a duty of due care is owed to preceived trespassers. 27
The many decisions creating exceptions to the limitations of a
landowner's duty would seem to illustrate an attempt to confine the
exemptions allowed within narrow limits. The principal case would
appear to be a marked reversal of this trend and should merit close
examination and critical appraisal.
Lucius M. CHESHIRE
09

See generally 2

HARPER

& JAMES § 27.1.

